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Introduction 
Scenes of workers or other citizens clashing with riot police 
are a common occurrence in South Korea. While this may come as no 
surprise to most adult Koreans, such collective mobilization challenges 
established theories of democratization and democratic consolidation 
that strongly associate the latter with moderation of social protests. I 
Unlike the expectation that the more a political structure 
accommodates participation, the less people protest 2 , protests have 
persisted in South Korea even after the country passed several tests of 
successful democratization. To be fair, violent and illegal protests have 
declined. But no important shifts in strategies, nor significant 
innovations in protest repertoires, seem to have taken place. 
Demonstrations and strikes have become part and parcel of Korean 
democracy. 
This article contends that political scientists have not paid 
sufficient attention to the ways in which political protest can contribute 
to the consolidation of a new democracy. Political contention in 
institutionalized democracies typically revolves around well-defined 
cleavages. When social movements lack institutional access and 
support structures for reform, movements are weak; however, a broader 
conception of stability and consolidation is necessary to enable the 
analyst to examine the consequences of contention over a protracted 
period. 
A change in some dimensions of the political opportunity 
structure in stable countries will send clear signals about the feasibility 
of protest. In a democratizing country, however, it is sometimes not 
clear how stable political alignments are and whether strategically­
placed allies will be available to protesting groups. In this situation, it 
is hard for groups in civil society to craft their demands as responses to 
partial openings or closings in the pre established institutional network 
of the polity (as in Western democracies). 
This article proceeds as follows. The first section, examines 
the theoretical links between democratization and protest, followed by 
an appraisal of the Korean transition in the second section. Section 
three introduces the role of labor mobilization in the transition. Once a 
polity becomes democratic, the argument goes, political opportunities 
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help determine the relative cost and benefit of protest. Consequently, 
sections four and five analyze the evolution of social protests during the 
Roh Tae Woo (1988-1993) and Kim Young Sam (1993-1998) 
administrations. 
According to prominent theories of democratic consolidation, 
the consolidation of a new democracy will occur only when 
cooperation replaces conflict as the most promising mechanism for 
advancing the interests of important groups. In final section then, the 
Kim Dae Jung administration's (1998-2003) experience with social 
concertation is evaluated. The paper concludes with the 
institutionalization of Korea's first significant progressive political 
force - the Democratic Labor Party (DLP). 
Protest and Democratization: The Links Revisited 
Political scientists have not clearly articulated the links 
between political protest and democratization. Despite the fact that 
popular mobilization contributed to the breakdown of many 
authoritarian regimes, the first studies of democratic transitions argued 
that the opening of access to power discouraged mobilization. In later 
works, some noted the profound discrepancy between existing theories 
and what was taking place on the ground.3 They quickly reasoned that 
opening political systems decreased the costs of mobilization, thereby 
increasing the likelihood that dissent would take place. The focus of 
such studies; however, remained on how social movements affected the 
process of transition or the democratization of civil society,4 not on 
what patterns of protest to expect once the initial transition ended. 
It is then that a second and much longer period begins in 
which institutional, behavioral and attitudinal regimes linking civil and 
political society are supposed to crystallize. 5 If all goes well, a 
consolidated democracy is born in which most conflicts are processed 
through institutions that evoke compliance of the relevant political 
forces.6 Along the way, actors learn? or find it in their own self interest 
to play by the rules of the new game.8 How exactly this procedural 
learning takes place, however, has not been demonstrated. 
To be sure, part of the problem lies in the perceived elite bias 
of the democratization literature. Collier and Mahoney argue that labor 
movements played pivotal roles in democratic transitions by moving 
the transition forward and expanding the scope of conflict in the new 
democratic regimes.9 Many studies, however, do not focus on the role 
of non-elites, usually because subordinate groups were not sufficiently 
strategic during the transition. Labor unions in some Southern 
European and Latin American countries resorted to mass protest once 
the transition began. The prevailing view, however, is that worker's 
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sense of relative deprivation played into the electoral maneuvering of 
the opposition. Once wages increased and economic growth was 
achieved, unions ceased to push for political goals. IO 
The exception is perhaps Valenzuela, who addressed the role 
and position occupied by the most influential social movement ­
organized labor - in processes of transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy. II While labor mobilization is important for the initial 
move towards a democratic transition, Valenzuela argued, labor's 
subsequent moderation is equally important in seeing the transition 
through to a successful democratic conclusion. 
The South Korean Transition: Changing Elite-Mass 
Relations? 
Studies of protest activity in democratic countries have relied 
on the notion of political opportunity structures (PaS) to explain the 
incidence, frequency, and intensity of political protests. Protest actions 
are considered rational to the extent that they result from favorable 
opportunities and the expectation of rewards. This assumption of 
calculation, however, is inconsistent with the protest cycles that have 
come to define contentious political participation in South Korea after 
the inauguration of the Sixth Republic. 12 
Because the transition to democracy in 1987 resulted in a 
government of reformed authoritarians who merged with the remaining 
two conservative parties in 1990 to create a Grand Conservative 
Coalition, trying to separate protest activity that is considered a reaction 
to perceived government illegitimacy from behavior that could be 
considered "normal" under a newly established democracy is at best 
difficult. As the numbers below make clear, the number of protests was 
higher every year from 1988 to 1992 than at any time during the Fifth 
Republic (except in 1987), and most of these events were illegal and 
violent. 
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55,692 59 6,000 Opposition to the 82,488 0.7:1 
Government 
74,215 76 5,500 Campus 168,989 0.4:1 
Democratization 
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1984 1,548 427,105 175 19,055 Opposition to the 
Government 
3,947,850 1:9 
1985 2,463 469,974 238 37,655 Opposition to the 
Government 
6,000,900 I: 12 
1986 2,201 514,730 269 12,090 Opposition to the 
Government 
(Constitutional 
Revision) 
6,540,600 1:13 
1987 12,957 3,145,667 338 194,998 Constitutional 
Revision, labor 
strikes, torture 
censure 
8,130,450 1:25 
1988 6,921 1,789,967 321 96,584 North-South 
festival, labor 
strife, 5th Republic 
liquidation 
6,626,528 1:3.7 
1989 7,056 1,984,987 337 69,910 Launching of 
Teacher's Union, 
Campaign to 
Liquidate the 
National Security 
Statue, 
Suppression of the 
Pyongyang 
People's Festival 
5,908,826 1:3.3 
I 
1990 6,715 1,874,874 332 98,580 5th Republic 
Liquidation, 3­
Party Merger 
2,076,073 I: l.l 
1991 6,491 2,382,000 337 105,000 Opposition to the 
Government 
2,217,222 1:0.9 
1992 4,946 1,604,400 350 61,200 Opposition to the 
Government 
1,509,840 1:0.9 
Source: Police Annual Report, National Police Agency, 1991 and 1992. 
These five years, contrary to Tarrow's (1993) depiction of a 
cycle of mobilization, do not fit the demonstrative effect of a 
mobilization cycle in which action on the part of a group of early risers 
triggers processes of diffusion, extension, imitation and reaction among 
other groups. Quite to the contrary, each of the actors instrumental in 
this cycle of mobilization - workers, students, dissidents and regular 
citizens - fits very differently into the smaller cycles of protest that 
made up this long period of mobilization. 
Labor was the first mass actor to mobilize through the 1987 
Great Workers' Struggle (July-September of 1987). This struggle was 
ignited right after Roh Tae Woo, then chairman of the ruling 
Democratic Justice Party, announced his eight-point democratization 
package. 13 On July 5, only a week after the surprise announcement, 
workers in strategic export zones began organize unions. Although 
strikes initially concentrated on higher wages and better working 
conditions, these 
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conditions, these unions (established independently of the official 
Federation of Korean Trade Unions) went well beyond narrow 
economic issues. 
The union movement, moreover, was politically and 
economically repressed at the time of the transition. Consequently, 
only well-paid manufacturing workers felt secure enough to demand 
the expansion of political rights and democratization on the shop floor. 
Through their actions, almost 1,500 unions sprang up within six months 
of the June 30 announcement. Many studies have emphasized the lack 
of organization and coordination14 and the economic nature of these 
strikes in which 1.3 million workers participated. More important, 
however, was the fact that this frontal challenge accomplished several 
important political goals. This form of class warfare resulted in fierce 
attacks against employers and managers, forcing the government to 
include revisions to the labor code in its reform package. Second, it 
created a new union leadership in more than 3,300 firms with a new 
creed - militant unionism - which, once mobilized, began to take a 
much more political overtone. IS 
Contrary to labor militancy in other democratic transitions, 
moreover, the 3,749 labor disputes occurring in 1987 did not represent 
an effort by the political opposition to enhance its electoral position.16 
As a matter of fact, the Great Workers' Struggle represented a serious 
threat to South Korea's export economy, but the ruling party could not 
repress these protests ahead of the first presidential and parliamentary 
elections. Having declared the principle of autonomous industrial 
relations, regime and oppositional elites had no choice but to address 
the labor question directly in the negotiations leading to a new 
constitution. 
In November of that year, the ruling DJP and the opposition 
New Democratic Party (NDP) amended the Trade Union Law, greatly 
simplifying the process of registering and organizing unions 11 and 
limiting administrative powers over internal union affairs. 18 With these 
revisions, unions broadened the terms of the transition to democracy 
and ensured they remained key actors in the post-transitional period. 19 
The democratic regime inaugurated between November of 
1987 and April of 1988, however, virtually guaranteed that the labor 
movement would make protests and strikes indispensable tools to make 
its voice heard. This ensured that the first condition identified by 
Valenzuela as facilitating democratic consolidation - labor union 
moderation - would not be present in the Korean context. By 
upholding the three nos in Korean industrial relations - no third party 
mediation in disputes (including trade union mediation), no labor 
participation in politics, and no labor organization beyond the firm 
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level - the Trade Union Act continued to deny labor rights of full 
democratic citizenship. 
The Sixth Republic: What Kind of Democracy? 
In South Korea, as we have seen, social movement actors not 
only possessed the conditions for independent intervention in the 
political arena, but, more importantly, became effective in confronting 
authoritarian elites and pressing traditional opposition elites to broaden 
the terms of the transition to democracy. Nevertheless, a second factor 
is necessary to understand the role of social movements in 
democratization - the capacity for coalition building of the established 
opposition. According to Sandoval, cohesion within the coalition 
confronting the authoritarian regime results in the incorporation of new 
actors into the realm of institutional politics. 
Over time, by stabilizing the political opportunity structure, 
social movement subordination to the agenda of the opposition makes 
political contention more predictable.20 In Korea's case, however, the 
opposition's lack of cohesion prevented the creation of an effective 
alliance with nascent social movements. As a result, the inauguration 
of the Sixth Republic in February of 1988 ignited a wave of social 
mobilization not witnessed in many other transitional settings. 
Ironically, one of Roh's first moves as president was to 
emphasize his desire to govern by consensus with the opposition. On 
January 11, Roh established a 52-member ad hoc Committee for the 
Promotion of Democracy and National Reconciliation (CPDNR). 
During the course of its deliberations, the CPDNR acknowledged that 
martial law had involved 'excessive' abuses of human rights. 21 On 
April 1, following the CPDNR's recommendations, Roh issued an 
official apology for the Kwangju massacre, which the government 
renamed "a struggle for democratization".22 
The ruling party, however, did not attain the much-sought 
consensus. The opposition viewed its reforms as delayed and 
insufficient, and this only contributed to the perception of the Roh 
13thregime as illegitimate. The outcome of the National Assembly 
elections (April 1988), in which the ruling Democratic Justice Party 
(DJP) lost its parliamentary majority, added to the problem by altering 
the stability of the new regime. This strategic opening was used by the 
opposition to press for a complete liquidation of the Fifth Republic and 
additional labor reforms. 
Because social movement organizations could count on their 
autonomous role, protests at least initially had more to do with 
collective group grievances than with emerging opportunities in the 
new political domain. Student protests in the first four years of the 
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Sixth Republic, for example, were less frequent than conflicts over 
democratic refonns between the parliamentary opposition and Roh Tae 
Woo's government. As a result, consistent temporal patterns of 
political protest can be observed, regardless of the year, during Roh Tae 
Woo's administration. The number of incidents was high in April and 
May - the traditional season of student activism - the summer, and the 
month ofNovember. 
Figure 1 
Number of tear gas incidents (1988-9.1992)23 
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Students sponsored the bulk of demonstrations from 1988 
through 1992. The number of demonstrations in which regular citizens 
and religious dissidents accounted for the bulk of protestors remained 
low, but was higher in some cases than protests sponsored by workers, 
who could be counted on the to use the strike as their preferred protest 
strategy.24 Student protests remained high in the number of participants 
and frequency until 1991. 
In tenn of participation, the numbers of those involved was 
high in 1989 and 1991, lower in 1988, 1990, and the first nine months 
of 1992. The beginning and ending years of Roh Tae Woo's 
administration were transitional years in which many potential 
protestors most likely waited out the consolidation of new patterns of 
governing. During this period, government efforts to put in place 
tougher measures to deter protests backfired. 
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On December 28, 1988, for example, President Roh Tae-woo 
made a special announcement signaling the end of the government's 
policy of not actively confronting strikes and demonstrations. Roh 
declared that South Korea was suffering from the "throes of 
democratization" and ordered a crackdown on violent anti-government 
protests and illegal labor disputes. "It is a daily event that universities 
and factories are paralyzed, illegal street protests cause traffic chaos, 
public offices, foreign missions and the National Assembly building are 
occupied and political party offices are firebombed," he said. 25 In 
response to the use of petrol bombs in confrontations with riot police or 
in incidences in which they were thrown at official buildings by anti­
government demonstrators, the Cabinet followed up on February 9 with 
a bill stipulating three years in jail for those carrying firebombs and 
seven years injail for those using them.26 
In spite of these announcements, protests increased throughout 
1989. A crippling strike at the Hyundai shipyard lasted 109 days and 
ended only when a massive military-style operation involving 20,000 
riot police stormed the shipyard from land, sea and air. On April 19, an 
amended Demonstration and Assembly Act took effect. With 
demonstrators using campuses as staging grounds for street battles, the 
government felt compelled to ban demonstrations in "prohibited 
zones," including the major streets in sixteen cities. 
The number of illegal strikes stayed high with almost 8,000 
new unions being created in the two years after 1987 and the rate of 
organization rising from 15 to 23 percent. There were 1,173 labor 
disputes in 1988 and 1,678 from January to October of 1989. 
Table 2 
Increase in Labor Unions and Labor Strikes 
Year Union 
Members 
Conflicts Strike 
participants 
Days lost 
1981 966,738 186 34,586 30,948 
1982 984,136 88 8,967 11,504 
1983 1,009,881 98 11,100 8,671 
1984 1,010,522 113 16,400 19,900 
1985 1,004,398 265 28,700 64,300 
1986 1,035,890 276 46,941 72,025 
1987 1,267,457 3,749 1,262,285 6,946,935 
1988 1,707,456 1,873 293,455 5,400,837 
1989 1,932,415 1,616 409,134 6,351,443 
1990 1,886,884 322 133,916 4,487,151 
1991 1,803,408 234 175,089 3,271,334 
1992 1,734,598 235 105,034 1,527,612 
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1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
1,667,373 
1,659,011 
1,614,800 
1,598,558 
1,484,194 
1,401,940 
1,480,666 
144 
121 
88 
85 
78 
129 
198 
108,577 
104,339 
49,717 
79,495 
43,991 
146,065 
92,026 
1,308,326 
1,484,368 
392,581 
892,987 
444,720 
1,452,096 
1,366,281 
Source: National Statistical Office 
The newly-established unions in strategic export industries 
increased their strength by coming together on a company level. The 
proportion of organized workers increased to 23.3 percent in 1989. 
Horizontal unionization was matched by vertical expansion. Five 
industrial federations were established by splitting existing federations 
and unionizing previously unorganized white-collar employers. White 
collar unions, unimaginable in the past, adopted a progressive and 
somewhat radical orientation. Finally, most enterprise unions, old and 
new, claimed the right of collective wage negotiation, sometimes with 
support from the industrial federation, but mostly on an independent 
basis. 
This was manifested in changes in the character and tactics of 
collective labor action in the years following the inauguration of the 
Sixth Republic. While the overall number of disputes stayed fairly 
high, collective action became more political and less economic in 
orientation and tactics more disruptive. In 1987, for example, 70.1 
percent of all disputes were over wages. In 1988 51.6 percent of 
disputes were over pay, compared to 47.6 percent in 1989. As for the 
right to bargain collectively, the numbers were 16.9 percent in 1988 
and 25.5 percent in 1989. Moreover, the average duration of a dispute 
increased to 17.8 days in 1989 from 10 days in the previous year. Most 
significant was the fact that 69 percent of the events for that year were 
deemed illegal under the Labor Dispute Adjustment Law.27 
The Creation of the DLP and the Modality of the Transition 
According to Valenzuela, for a democracy to reach the stage 
of consolidation, opposition elites have to ensure that labor moderates 
its demands once the initial transition is over. This proper sequence of 
mobilization-moderation is deemed conducive to successful 
democratization. This picture, however, is complicated by the electoral 
uncertainty surrounding the transition to democracy. The transition is 
more likely to be uncertain when, following several years of 
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authoritarianism, legislative and presidential elections are held in which 
the electoral strength of the ruling party and the opposition are not 
entirely known. 
Labor moderation usually occurs when labor possesses either 
a mass party or a nationwide peak organization. In South Korea, 
however, neither of the two was the case. In 1990, moreover, the 
fonnation of the conservative super-majority Democratic Liberal Party 
(DLP), modeled on the LDP in Japan, ended hopes in progressive 
circles of a political alliance with opposition parties.28 The three party 
merger - which took place on January 12, 1990, the same day the 
Korea Trade Union Congress (KTUC Chunnohyup) was launched ­
was designed to realign the conservative camp. 
The government attempted to use its newly acquired 299-vote 
majority in the National Assembly to circumvent normal procedures 
and enact a series of controversial measures. Kim Dae Jung's Liberal 
Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD) was unable to block these 
measures successfully in spite of chaotic filibusters. 29 In a move 
calculated to bring a return to the extra-parliamentary tactics 
successfully used from 1985 to 1987, the 80-member opposition 
resigned in masse and called for an immediate general election (July 
1990). The opposition's structural weakness, however, prevented the 
skillful use of mobilization to advance its goals. 
Figure 2 
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In May of 1991, there was a dramatic and brief spike in 
political protest.3] The trigger was news that the police had beaten a 
student to death during a protest the previous April 26. Protests first 
erupted on university campuses, but soon protestors embarked on a 
short period of street politics that brought about remarkable turnouts. 
At first, the government opted to stay away as protests escalated. The 
turning point came when the president announced that he would not 
seek a constitutional revision for a cabinet system. Almost 
simultaneously, it was announced that a deal for the introduction of a 
local administration system had been reached. The following figure 
reveals the extent of popular mobilization during that extraordinary 
month 
In two polls conducted in June of 1992, the majority of 
respondents (80.6%) were of the opinion that the government should 
handle student demonstrations in a moderate and sensible way. 
Furthermore, 62.6% of those polled felt that student demonstrations had 
a positive effect on the country's political climate. 32 Nevertheless, 
protest activity was far from becoming institutionalized as the number 
of unreported protests (4,170), by definition illegal, continued to 
surpass that of reported incidents (642) in the last year of Roh Tae 
Woo's administration.33 
Kim Young Sam's "Civil Government": 
The Institutionalization of Protest? 
It was the election of Kim Young Sam in 1992 that some see 
as initiating the institutionalization of protest activity in South Korea. 
Kim Young Sam was the first democratically-elected civilian president 
in thirty-two years. His popularity, moreover, made it difficult for civil 
society to challenge the state based on its intrinsic legitimacy. As a 
result, his accomplishments and failures34 form a good starting point for 
scholarly debates over the relative importance of "reform from above" 
as compared to "pressure from below". Some view democratic 
consolidation as a consequence of mass pressures for meaningful 
reforms. Still others argue that consolidation results from a 
combination of "reform from above" and "pressure from below". Still 
others view continued mobilization as dangerous, especially when 
representative institutions are still fragile. 
Indeed, Kim Young Sam's presidency is best known for the 
(sometimes unintended) interplay of political reforms emanating from 
above and popular reaction to these initiatives, particularly in the areas 
of labor and prosecution of authoritarian elites for human rights 
violations. Encouraged by Kim's reformist offensive, some groups 
began to articulate a vision of civic participation centered, in the words 
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of Lewis, on "new, less confrontational, un-provocative, peaceful ­
essentially depoliticized" - means of popular participation.35 The use 
of Molotov cocktails, steel pipes, stones, railway and road occupations, 
and attacks on public buildings are all examples of established forms of 
violent direct action in the protest repertoire of popular organizations in 
South Korea. Although their use declined dramatically, however, the 
overall level of demonstrations did not appreciably change. 
Figure 3 
Number of rallies and demonstrations, 1995-199936 
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Some argue that this represented a major change in the culture 
of protest in a democratizing context.3? They cite the widely-known 
examRle of The Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice, founded in 
1989 8, as an example of a social movement trying to work within 
rather than outside of the system,39 Other groups, however, continued 
their militancy in the face of popular disenchantment with their tactics. 
The student movement, for example, became more radical and less 
influential by the mid 1990s.40 In response to public criticism of its 
violent tactics, student activists renamed their organization the National 
Federation of University Student Councils (or Hanch 'ongryon).41 As 
late as 1996, college students remained highly visible participants in the 
May 18 anniversary festivities held annually in Kwangju. 
Most importantly, Kim's globalization blueprint spelled more 
trouble in the area of industrial relations. The government's policy 
handed labor limited political incorporation, but the unions did not 
respond favorably by moderating their behavior. Quite the contrary, 
they vigorously pursued the cause of democratic unionism, mainly 
through the use of strikes and other disruptive actions. In June 1993 
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Chonnodae) brought together leaders of all "democratic" trade unions 
into a single national body. In the summer of 1994, almost 100,000 
workers walked off their jobs, many of them associated with 
Chonnodae. This strike combined economic demands with the fight for 
independent trade unions. Not since the "Great Workers' Struggle" in 
the summer of 1987, moreover, had there been such an impressive 
show of force by workers. 
On November 13, 1994, democratic unionists launched the 
Preparatory Committee for the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions 
(KCTU). The Committee's main task was to prepare and facilitate the 
reorganization of individual unions into various industrial federations 
and the formation of the Confederation. This led to a nationwide 
struggle in 1995 against a new wage curb policy driven by government 
and employers. As a show of strength, a national workers' rally was 
organized by representatives of over a thousand individual unions. On 
November 23,1995, KCTU (Minju Noch'ong) applied to the Ministry 
of Labor for "acquisition of legality" after being officially established 
with 862 enterprise unions and a total membership of418,000. 
Finally, social protests surfaced nationwide in late 1995 
regarding the issue of confronting and grappling with the authoritarian 
past. After a year-long investigation of the military putsch of 
December 1979 and the Kwangju Massacre, the government confirmed 
in October 1994 that Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo had 
engineered a military revolt. The Kim government announced in July 
1995, however, that it would not pursue insurrection charges because 
the statute of limitations on these crimes had expired. 
Students immediately reacted with a nationwide boycott of 
classes.42 A Committee of 297 civil society groups collected signatures 
from one million citizens, calling for the imprisonment ofRoh and held 
rallies attended by tens of thousands of students and regular citizens.43 
Throughout November 1995, thousands of students, workers, 
movement activists, and ordinary citizens waged street demonstrations 
in Seoul and other major cities of the country.44 Yielding to popular 
pressure, the government finally prosecuted Chun and Roh in early 
1996 on multiple charges ofbribery, insurrection, and treason.45 
Class Conflict and the 'High Tech' General Strike 
But it is perhaps South Korea's first general strike that best 
highlights the role that political protest can play in a democratizing 
context. This is because the 'high tech' general strike, as some refer to 
it, took place not during the transition to democracy, but when some 
were beginning to speak of the ROK as a consolidated democracy. 
This does not contradict the reality of the strike's extraordinary degree 
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of organization, which was choreographed with great skill by workers 
and law enforcement officials. The strike, however, involved various 
unions from different sectors of the economy, and it directly challenged 
the political regime. The political nature of the South Korean general 
strike was universally recognized. 
As early as 1994, Kim Young Sam had signaled his intention 
to reform the labor code, criticized as outdated and repressive. Reform 
bureaucrats had favored legalizing the Korean Confederation of Trade 
Unions (KCTU) and repealing clauses that prohibited union's political 
activities by unions. The environment was favorable, since Kim's 
government was eager to join the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
The strategy of getting labor to allow greater employer 
flexibility in exchange for political recognition, however, failed in 
garnering labor support. Leaders of both the conservative FKTU and 
the progressive KCTU defended Korea's traditional system of lifetime 
employment and seniority while calling for an immediate lifting of the 
three prohibitions. The KCTU representatives in particular argued that 
the ban on multiple unionism undermined the freedom of association of 
workers and was inconsistent with international practice. Furthermore, 
they asked for the right of government employees and teachers to 
unionize and the end of restrictions on collective bargaining for certain 
strategic sectors such as the defense industry. 
Businesses vetoed any compromise with the unions. The 
ruling party, which responded to the interests of the chaebol, endorsed 
a "chaebol law" enshrining lay-offs and delaying the legalization of the 
KCTU for another three years. Despite criticism from opposition 
parties, which made it clear that the bill stood no chance of passing, the 
ruling party rammed the bills through the National Assembly in a 
predawn session without the presence of opposition legislators. 
The demonstrations of December 1996 and January 1997 did 
not reach the scale of the 'Great Struggle' of 1987 and did not bring the 
country to a standstill. The number of individual unions and organized 
workers who took part in the General Strike for at least one day 
amounted to 528 and 403,179 respectively. This accounted for 81.1 % 
of the total membership of KCTU, but less than 10% of Korea's 
workforce. Nevertheless, they forced the New Korea Party to amend 
the Labor Code in March of 1997 to make it more amenable to labor's 
demands. Albeit minor, the revisions led to a profound realignment of 
electoral and legislative politics, increasing the legitimacy and depth of 
electoral democracy. 
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Kim Dae Jung's 'Participatory Market Economy': 
Democratic Consolidation? 
As Western industrialized democratic nations have shown, 
democratic consolidation is a process of managing social tensions and 
resolving political conflicts through the incorporation of subordinate 
groups into the institutional circle of politics. In this respect, the 
dawning of the IMF stewardship regime in December 1997 coincided 
with a historical political transition in which Kim Dae Jung became the 
first opposition party candidate to be elected President since the 
founding of the Republic in 1948. Kim Dae Jung had campaigned on 
the theme of a 'democratic market economy,' balancing efficiency 
through the market place with participation throufh political 
institutions. Having been elected with KCTU sUpport,4 he was the 
first politician to form a political coalition with labor.47 
The economic coIlapse, however, created an urgent sense of 
national crisis which permeated alI Korean institutions.48 Recognizing 
that the understanding between the IMF and the outgoing Kim Young 
Sam government would provoke fierce resistance from both the 
chaebols and the unions, Kim Dae-jung established the first of what 
were to be four Tripartite Commissions in January 1998. Unlike 
previous government overtures to unions and employers, the 
Commission was a serious attempt to create a genuine national 
negotiation forum involving all stakeholders. Members included 
eleven senior figures from the government, the main political parties, 
the KCTU, the FKTU, and business.49 
The IMF-mandated reforms, however, have been interpreted 
by the unions as an attack on workers' jobs and livelihoods. KCTU 
leaders in particular have resorted to large demonstrations and strikes5o , 
such as a general strike in the summer of 2003 involving 134 unions 
and about 66,000 members, including the country's three automobile 
manufacturing groups. In this situation, unions have fended off 
government appeals to the national interest. 51 This has been 
particularly true in heavy industry. Major strikes involving workers at 
Hyundai, Daewoo, the shipyards and the electrical power industry 
broke out in 1998-2002, and these were foIlowed in 2003 by strikes in 
the transportation, manufacturing and chemical sectors. In many cases 
these were the subject of violent repression by law and order forces. 
The arrests and the use of repressive legislation by the incumbent Roh 
Moo-hyun administration (2003-) has led in some extreme cases to a 
return to the methods of suicide and/or self-immolation by union 
leaders. 
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Conclusion 
Sandoval argues that there is a significant correlation between, 
on the one hand, the degree of democratic regime stability, and, on the 
other, the degree to which social movements remain autonomous and 
allied to opposition elites during a democratic transition. After a 
founding election that results in a reordering of the political and 
electoral fields, active civil society organizations face a choice: 
continued mobilization or subordination to more influential political 
forces. Particularly in countries where the opposition to 
authoritarianism played a significant role before the transition 52 , 
democracy creates a dilemma: how much to oppose new incumbents 
and by what means. 
This approach, however, ignores the possibility that even 
when social movements fail to be incorporated in the political process 
through alliances with the opposition, other outcomes are overlooked 
that point to structural transformations and changes in their capacity to 
remain key political actors. South Korea's first progressive political 
force - the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) - serves as an example that 
long-term mobilization can have a positive effect on the politics of 
democratic consolidation. The DLP originated from People's Victory 
21, a political alliance organized by the Korea Confederation of Trade 
Unions (KCTU) to field candidates in the 1997 presidential election 
and in the 1998 local elections. Succeeding Peoples' Victory 21, the 
preliminary Committee for a Progressive Party was organized in 1999. 
This was followed by the launching of the DLP in January 2000. 
The DLP describes itself as "a political party of workers, 
peasantry, urban poor, small businessmen, women, students and 
progressive intellectuals." 53 In 2002, it emerged in third position, 
winning 8.1 percent of the party vote in the June local elections. In the 
2002 presidential election, the DLP's candidate, Kwon Young-ghil, 
gained 3.9% of votes. Unprecedented by Korean standards, in April 
2004 the DLP became the first political force in South Korean history 
to gain parliamentary representation by winning 10 seats in the 299­
member single legislature. 54 The DLP's platform features a 40-hour, 
five-day work week, mandatory hiring of unemployed youth, 
guarantees of public sector workers' labor rights and worker 
participation in management. This is likely to lead to a more 
progressive social policy and hence a broader legitimation of electoral 
democracy, both significant accomplishments given South Korea's 
paltry record in the area of social democratization. 
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